we be? (Retrenchment might parallel a similar Bush administration move toward re gional and bilateral trade policy, where avoiding multilateral negotiations facilitates the exercise of relative U.S. power in securing deeper trade integration and the leverage to secure better terms of trade in nonweapons-sensitive market sectors.) I raise these questions about the continued utility of existing multilateral regimes in the spirit of Lord Keynes, who also said, "Words ought to be a litde wild, for they are the assault of thoughts on the unthinking."9
If there were ever any doubt, the death of more than three thousand American and foreign nationals on September 11th now clearly estab lishes the need to think through arms control and nonproliferation policy from the ground up, so that law follows good policy and the shackles of international law do not prevent us from getting things right. Let us now look at the real world gains in international security to be achieved in arms control and nonproliferation policies as we grapple with these larger questions of legal strategy. Department of Defense Associate Deputy General Counsel Jack Beard will now address the bilateral efforts of the Bush administration to address the threat of chemi cal and biological weapons proliferation, particularly in the soft underbelly of Russia, the region of greatest strategic interest today.
A New Urgency About Anthrax:
Recent Efforts to Prevent the Proliferation of Biological
Weapons in the Former Soviet Union by Jack M. Beard*
The threat of biological weapons, once an obscure topic to most Americans, achieved new prominence and urgency in the United States with the anthrax letter attacks that followed the terrorist attacks of September 11, 200L A number of infections traced to a handful of anthrax-laced letters focused unprecedented attention in America on the danger of biological weapons (BW). Coupled with continuing reports of attempts by terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction, this has made efforts to prevent BW proliferation a high priority for the U.S. government.
Notwithstanding the new prominence of the BW threat, the U.S. government recendy withdrew its support of a seven-year effort to create a new protocol to improve moni toring and inspections under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).1 Con cerned that the protocol's approach would compromise sensitive biological defense and confidential business information and would do nothing to increase compliance with the BWC, U.S. Nov. 20, 2001 , at A8 (noting that Mr. Bolton also said that "the time for 'better than nothing' protocols is over" and that "we will continue to reject flawed texts like the BWC draft protocol, recommended to us simply because they are the product of lengthy negotiations or arbitrary deadlines, if such texts are not in the best interests of the United States" ).
to focus attention on the number of BWC member countries with offensive BW pro grams. In response, domestic and foreign commentators strongly cridcized the U.S.
position, questioning America's commitment to this and other multilateral efforts.3
Although the United States rejected the proposed BWC protocol, it continues to com bat the threat posed by biological weapons by other means, including increased bilateral efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. In a recent meeting with the president of Russia, President Bush declared that "our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" and that Mwe will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise."4 In this regard, there is no greater threat than that posed by the legacy of the Soviet Union's BW program. In addition to five military microbiological facilities under the control of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, it has been reported that as many as forty-seven other scientific institutes and production facilities worked on biological weapons under the cover of numerous other Soviet ministries and organizations. 10,1996 , Sept. 9,1998 , Dec. 17,1999 , and July 29, 2000 
